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NOTES
CONDITIONAL INHERITANCE IN NEw YORK
Attempts by testators to influence, after their death, the lives of
their beneficiaries are by no means new to the law.1 These attempts
often take the form of restrictions on the enjoyment of property dis-
posed of by will. It is the object of this article to particularize the
efficacy of such attempts when they take the form of conditions prece-
dent and subsequent to the vesting of the property.
Before proceeding, however, it is appropriate to distinguish among
terms used in this area of the law. If the entire will is to be effective
only if a specified event does or does not occur, the will is a condi-
tional will. 2 If, on the other hand, the enjoyment of a particular
inheritance depends upon the performance or non-performance of
some act, that particular legacy or devise is subject to a condition.
If the performance so specified must occur before the estate can vest,
the condition is precedent; unless it be performed, the gift fails. If
the performance does not necessarily precede the vesting of the estate,
but may accompany or follow it, the condition is subsequent; if
breached, the estate will be divested.3 Closely related to estates on
I Conditions in wills were known to the law of ancient Rome. Pound,
Legacies On Impossible Or Illegal Conditions Precedent, 3 ILL. L. REv. 1, 5(1908); Browder, Conditions And Linitations In Restraint Of Marriage,
39 MIcH. L. REv. 1288 (1941) ; Note, 10 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. Rv. 154 (1955).
Holdsworth records the interesting will of Robert Goche who, in 1556, devised
property to his son, who was to study law and become a "Sergeaunte of the
Coiff," on condition that ". . . he never take penny or any manner of rewarde
for his councell, but to give the same to all men without taking anny things
... and if he do otherwise thenne I wille that he shall have no more of my
manors and landes before to him geven, but only the mannour of Horkestowe,
and that all the rest ymmediatlie after suche taking of monney for his counsell
shall revert to my sonne Robert." 7 HoLDsWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 372 (2d ed. 1937).
2 See, e.g., Matter of Poonarian, 234 N.Y. 329, 137 N.E. 606 (1922), where
a will was to be effective if the testator died on a trip from New York to
Constantinople. Because the testator died after he returned to New York, it
was held that the condition to the will's effectiveness had not been met, and the
will was denied probate. However, if an occasion of possible danger, such as
a forthcoming journey, merely supplies the inducement for making a will at
that time, the will is given effect even though the testator dies at a time
different from that contemplated. Eaton v. Brown, 193 U.S. 411 (1904).
3 Matter of Dettmer, 177 Misc. 349, 30 N.Y.S.2d 571 (Surr. Ct. 1941);
Martin v. Ballou, 13 Barb. 119, 133 (Gen. T. 4th Dist. 1852) (dictum); cf.
Underhill v. Saratoga & W. R.R., 20 Barb. 455, 459 (Gen. T. 4th Dist. 1855)
(dictum) ; II DAVIDS, NEW YORx LAW OF WILLS § 878 (1924).
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condition subsequent are estates on limitation. The enjoyment of the
latter is intended to cease when a certain event occurs, without regard
to whether or not the event constitutes a breach of a condition.
4
The purpose of construing a will is to ascertain and effectuate
the intent of the testator.5 Therefore, courts will not limit themselves
to an examination of a particular phrase in a will in order to deter-
mine what the testator intended. To effectuate properly the testator's
intent, the courts will look at the whole instrument. 6 Furthermore,
no particular words are necessary to create a condition if the intent
to do so may be fairly gleaned from the will.7 However, the law
favors the vesting of estates." Therefore, precatory words, indicating
that something is merely the wish or desire of the testator, will not
be construed as creating a condition or obligation.9 Similarly, where
language is ambiguous as to the testator's intent, the law favors a
construction that no condition was intended. 10 Moreover, because the
law favors early vesting, courts will construe a condition as subse-
quent, rather than precedent, wherever possible."-
Enforceability of Conditions
Generally, conditions will be enforced if they are legal and definite
in their requirements. 12 However, a condition subsequent to a legacy
4 See Matter of Horton, 160 Misc. 64, 289 N.Y. Supp. 618 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ;
6 A ERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 692 (Casner ed. 1952); ATKINSON, WILLS 405
(2d ed. 1953) ; Note, 10 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. Rv. 154, 155 (1955).
5 Matter of Krooss, 302 N.Y. 424, 429, 99 N.E.2d 222, 225 (1951) (dictum);
Matter of Rooker, 248 N.Y. 361, 364, 162 N.E. 283, 284 (1928) (dictum). But
see ATKINSON, WILLS 816-17 (2d ed. 1953); POWELL, FUTURE INTERESTS 200(2d ed. 1937).
6 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Parker, 146 N.Y. 29, 40 N.E. 635 (1895) (where
words "on condition" were construed as impressing a charge on the estate);
Matter of Gaffers, 254 App. Div. 448, 5 N.Y.S.2d 671 (3d Dep't 1938) (where
"upon condition" was construed as importing a covenant). See also ATKINSON,
WILLS 811 (2d ed. 1953).
Matter of Mahlstedt, 140 Misc. 245, 251, 250 N.Y. Supp. 628, 639 (Surr.
Ct. 1931) (dictum) ; cf. Matter of Gaffers, supra note 6 at 453, 5 N.Y.S.2d at
678 (dictum) ; Underhill v. Saratoga & W. R.R., supra note 3 at 459 (dictum);
Martin v. Ballou, supra note 3 at 133 (dictum).
8 Matter of Krooss, supra note 5 at 427, 99 N.E.2d at 224 (dictum) ; Matter
of Watson, 262 N.Y. 284, 300, 186 N.E. 787, 791 (1933) (dictum); II DAvMS,
NEW YORK LAW OF WILLS § 951 (1924).
9 Post v. Moore, 181 N.Y. 15, 73 N.E. 482 (1905); Matter of Johnston,
277 App. Div. 239, 99 N.Y.S.2d 219 (3d Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 782,
98 N.E.2d 895 (1951) (alternate holding).
10 See, e.g., Tillman v. Ogren, 227 N.Y. 495, 125 N.E. 821 (1920); Matter
of Gaffers, supra note 6; In re Allen's Estate, 45 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Surr. Ct.
1943). See also ATKINSON, WILLS 402 (2d ed. 1953).
11 See, e.g., In re Allen's Estate, supra note 10; Matter of Enders, 171 Misc.
283, 13 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Surr. Ct. 1939); Matter of Lesser, 158 Misc. 895,
287 N.Y. Supp. 209 (Surr. Ct. 1936) ; In re Scott's Will, 204 N.Y. Supp. 478,
491 (Surr. Ct. 1924) (dictum) ; ATKINSON, WILLS 404 (2d ed. 1953).
12 See, e.g., In re Dehncke's Will, 116 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Surr. Ct. 1952) (In
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of personal property, which has no gift over to an alternate beneficiary
in event of breach of the condition, is unenforceable. 13 It is regarded
as a nullity on the tenuous assumption that it was designed to place
the beneficiary in terrorem of the threatened, but ineffective, divest-
ment.' 4  For purposes of the in terrorem rule,15 a general gift of the
residue of the estate is not regarded as a gift over to an alternate
beneficiary.16 However, if the will expressly provides that in event
of a breach of the condition subsequent the legacy is to fall into the
residue of the estate, which is expressly bequeathed, there is a suffi-
cient gift over to render the condition enforceable. 1 7  Furthermore,
legacies of personalty "inseparably attached" to realty devised in the
will are subject to conditions subsequent to the same extent as the
realty; that is, otherwise valid conditions subsequent on such legacies
are effective even though unaccompanied by a gift over.' 8
Conditions which involve illegality are universally condemned.
To determine illegality, the applicable test is: if the result of enforce-
ment of a condition would induce conduct detrimental to the public
interest, the condition is illegal.19 Somewhat more complex is the
effect of illegality on a condition. If the illegal provision is a condi-
tion subsequent, the condition is disregarded and the gift is absolute.2 0
this construction proceeding, one condition divesting a husband of property
devised to him by his wife if he should "disapate" [sic], was held invalid as
being too indefinite to be capable of enforcement. However, the court held
that the husband took only a fee simple conditional because another condition,
divesting the husband if he remarried, was lawful.) ; In re Jackson's Will,
20 N.Y. Supp. 380 (Surr. Ct. 1892). ". . [L]egacies and devisees ... [are]
acts of bounty merely. The testator . . . [is] free to withhold them altogether,
or to subject them to conditions, whether sensible or futile. The gift is to be
taken as it is made or not at all..... Oliver v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 451, 459,
173 N.E. 676, 679 (1930).
13 Matter of Johnston, 277 App. Div. 239, 99 N.Y.S.2d 219 (3d Dep't 1950),
aff'd, 302 N.Y. 782, 98 N.E.2d 895 (1951) (alternate holding); Matter of
Arrowsmith, 162 App. Div. 623, 147 N.Y. Supp. 1016 (1st Dep't 1914), aff'd,
213 N.Y. 704, 108 N.E. 1089 (1915); Matter of Vandevort, 62 Hun 612,
17 N.Y. Supp. 316 (Gen. T. 5th Dep't 1892) (alternate holding).
14 6 AmEucAN LAw OF PROPEMTY 592 (Casner ed. 1952). "The condition
where there is no devise over, is said to be in terrorem merely, a convenient
phrase adapted by the judges to stand in the place of a reason for refusing to
give effect to a valid condition." Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N.Y. *162, *171 (1882).
'5 Basically, the in terrorern rule is not applicable to realty. Hogan v. Curtin,
supra note 14; Mooney v. Mooney, 115 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
16 See Matter of Enders, 171 Misc. 283, 13 N.Y.S.2d 766 (Surr. Ct. 1939);
Matter of Bailey, 141 Misc. 748, 253 N.Y. Supp. 275 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
17 In re Von Grimm's Will, 133 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Surr. Ct. 1954); Matter of
Kirkholder, 86 Misc. 692, 149 N.Y. Supp. 87 (Surr. Ct. 1914), aff'd, 171 App.
Div. 153, 157 N.Y. Supp. 37 (4th Dep't 1916).
Is In re Parson's Will, 115 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Surr. Ct. 1952).
19 Browder, Illegal Conditions And Limitations: Miscellaneous Provisions,
1 OKLA. L. REv. 237, 238 (1948); 9 MIAMI L.Q. 493 (1955).
20 Matter of Haight, 51 App. Div. 310, 316, 64 N.Y. Supp. 1029, 1033 (2d
Dep't 1900) (dictum) ; see, e.g., Matter of Filkins, 203 Misc. 454, 120 N.Y.S.2d
124 (Surr. Ct. 1952); Matter of Dettmer, 176 Misc. 512, 27 N.Y.S.2d 609
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If, however, the provision is construed as a limitation on an estate,
since no element of forfeiture is considered involved, the authorities
agree that it is enforceable regardless of its inducement to act contrary
to the public good.21  Thus, a devise to a son "'if he should remain
unmarried" is absolute, because the condition is unenforceable. On
the other hand, a devise "so long as he remains unmarried" is subject
to divestment in the event of marriage. This distinction has been
characterized as a mere "quibble" 22 and the result, however logical,
has been severely criticized 23 as it allows a testator to effectuate an
unlawful purpose merely by a careful selection of words. A condition
precedent involving malum prohibitum is disregarded with respect to
personalty and the legacy is considered unconditional. 24 Although it
is usually accepted that where the condition involves malum in se,
or is attached to realty, both the condition and the bequest are void,
the law is not settled in this area.25 These rules which would accord
different treatment to conditions on realty and conditions on per-
sonalty have also been subject to great criticism.26
Particular Illegal Conditions
The vast majority of conditions found to be illegal involve inter-
ference with the formation or maintenance of family relationships, or
involve attempts to prevent interference with the distribution of the
estate.2 7 Restraints on marriage, inducements to divorce, and attempts
to separate parents from their children fall into the first category.
Provisions for forfeiture if the beneficiary contests the will are
considered in the second.
(Surr. Ct), aff'd, 262 App. Div. 1032, 30 N.Y.S.2d 333 (2d Dep't 1941), aff'd,
289 N.Y. 597, 43 N.E.2d 830 (1942).
21 See Irwin v. Irwin, 179 App. Div. 871, 876, 167 N.Y. Supp. 76, 79 (2d
Dep't 1917); 6 AMERIcAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 27.14 (Casner ed. 1952);
ATKINSON, WILLS 406 (2d ed. 1953) ; Browder, Illegal Conditions And Litni-
tations: Effect Of Illegality, 47 MIcH . L. REv. 759, 773 (1949) ; Note, 10 N.Y.U.
INTRA. L. Rrv. 154, 155 (1955).
22 ATxNSON, WiLLs 406 (2d ed. 1953).
23 See 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PRos rT § 27.14 (Casner ed. 1952) ; ATKINSON,
WiLLs 406 (2d ed. 1953) ; Browder, supra note 21, at 773.
24 See Matter of Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 18 N.E.2d 658 (1939) ; Matter of
Haight, supra note 20 at 310, 64 N.Y. Supp. at 1029; In re Blind's Will, 138
N.Y.S.2d 210 (Surr. Ct. 1954); ATiINsON, WILLS 414 (2d ed. 1953).
25 See, e.g., Matter of Liberman, supra note 24 at 468, 18 N.E.2d at 662;
Matter of Haight, 51 App. Div. 310, 316, 64 N.Y. Supp. 1029, 1033-34 (2d Dep't
1900). See also ATKINSON, WILLS 414 (2d ed. 1953). However, it should be
noted that a condition involving inalum in se has never arisen in New York.
Furthermore, "the tendency of the courts has been to ignore distinctions between
'legacies out of personal estate' and legacies or devises of interests in real
property.... The beneficiary takes under the will as if no conditions had been
annexed to the gift to him or as if he had complied with the void condition."
Matter of Liberman, supra note 24 at 468-69, 18 N.E.2d at 662.2 6 ATK NsoN, WILLS 407 (2d ed. 1953); Browder, Illegal Conditions And
Limitations: Effect Of Illegality, 47 MicH. L. REv. 759, 763 (1949).
27 See Browder, supra note 26, at 759.
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Judge Lehman has succinctly outlined the New York law on
marriage provisions as follows:
A condition calculated to induce a beneficiary to marry, even to marry in
a manner desired by the testator, is not against public policy. A condition
calculated to induce a beneficiary to live in celibacy or adultery is against public
policy. "Conditions in general restraint of marriage were regarded at common
law as contrary to public policy, and, therefore, void." The rule still prevails
in New York. . . . Conditions in partial restraint of marriage, which merely
impose reasonable restrictions upon marriage, are not against public policy.2 8
Conditions which operate to restrain a beneficiary from marrying a
certain person,29 or outside a particular religion,30 or during
minority,3 1 are regarded as reasonable, partial restraints, and there-
fore enforceable. Such restraints are, however, construed very
strictly against forfeiture. 3 2 This is illustrated by the recent New
York decision in Matter of Rosenthal.3" There the testator apparently
desired to dissuade his beneficiaries from marrying Gentiles. His wil
contained conditions both precedent and subsequent to prevent
legatees, devisees and donees of powers of appointment from taking
under the will or exercising powers under the will if they married
outside the Jewish religion. Testator's grandson exercised his power
of appointment, over the corpus of a trust established under the will,
in favor of his daughter, who intended to marry a Gentile. In the
construction proceeding brought by the daughter, the dissenting
opinion declared that the testator's obvious intent should control.
Nevertheless, the majority, by a very narrow construction, held that
the great-granddaughter would take unconditionally as the will's sanc-
tions were not explicitly directed against appointees.
Conditions prescribing forfeiture in the event of marriage are
upheld where directed against a second marriage of the testator's
21 Matter of Liberman, supra note 24 at 464, 18 N.E.2d at 660.
29 See, e.g., Matter of Seaman, 218 N.Y. 77, 112 N.E. 576 (1916).
30 Matter of Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458. 464, 18 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1939)
(dictum); cf. Matter of Rosenthal, 283 App. Div. 316, 127 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1st
Dep't), aff'd mere., 307 N.Y. 715, 121 N.E.2d 539 (1954) ; Matter of Solomon,
156 Misc. 445, 281 N.Y. Supp. 827 (Surr. Ct. 1935). In addition, conditions
that require a person to be raised in a particular religion are valid. Matter of
Kempf, 252 App. Div. 28, 297 N.Y. Supp. 307 (4th Dep't 1937), aff'd meem.,
278 N.Y. 613, 16 N.E.2d 123 (1938) ; Matter of Lesser, 158 Misc. 895, 287 N.Y.
Supp. 209 (Surr. Ct. 1936). However, in one old case, a Virginia court held
invalid a condition subjecting a legacy to forfeiture if the legatee should leave
a certain religious sect. This sect forbade marriage outside the religion under
pain of expulsion. Because there were only five or six marriageable men whom
the legatee might marry, the condition was an unreasonable restraint on mar-
riage and was void. Maddox v. Maddox, 52 Va. (11 Gratt.) *804 (1854).
31 Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N.Y. *162 (1882).
32 See, e.g., Matter of Rosenthal, supra note 30: Matter of Solomon, supra
note 30.
3 283 App. Div. 316, 127 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1st Dep't), aff'd nere., 307 N.Y.
715, 121 N.E.2d 539 (1954).
[ VOL. 30
NOTES
widow or widower.34 Another exception to the rule proscribing such
forfeitures is sometimes made where the testator's intent was simply
to provide support until marriage.35 Here, however, the beneficiary
must be a female relative whose support will devolve upon her spouse
in the event of marriage or remarriage. Thus, such a provision is
valid if intended for support of a daughter 3 6 or daughter-in-law, 3 7
but not for a friend 3 8 or a son.39 In addition, a condition that a
legacy is to be effective only if the legatee is unmarried at the time of
testator's death is valid.40  Here the condition cannot act as a restraint
on future conduct because the status is fixed as of the time the will
and its condition become effective.
Analogous to the state's discouragement of restraints on marriage
is its condemnation of conditions which tend to disrupt existing mar-
riages. Thus, a legacy purportedly effective only if the legatee obtains
a divorce or separation is absolute and vests immediately because the
condition is legally a nullity.41 In the exceptional case it may be
upheld where it was intended as a support provision.42 Of course,
a legacy for a son, to be effective only if he obtained a divorce, is
absolute and the condition void because the separated status would
require less, not more money, for living expenses ; 43 it could not have
34 Matter of Byrnes, 260 N.Y. 465, 184 N.E. 56 (1933) (by implication);
In re Dehncke's Will, 116 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Surr. Ct. 1952); Mooney v. Mooney,
115 N.Y.S.2d 167 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Note, 10 N.Y.U. INTRA. L. REv. 154, 155
(1955).
35 See ATKINSON, WiL.s 406 (2d ed. 1953) ; RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 424
(1944); Browder, Conditions And Limitations In Restraint Of Marriage,
39 MICH. L. REv. 1288, 1328 (1941).
36 Cf. Matter of Horton, 160 Misc. 64, 289 N.Y. Supp. 618 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
37 Irwin v. Irwin, 179 App. Div. 871, 167 N.Y. Supp. 76 (2d Dep't 1917).
38 Matter of Dettmer, 176 Misc. 512, 27 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Surr. Ct.), aff'd,
262 App. Div. 1032, 30 N.Y.S.2d 333 (2d Dep't 1941), aff'd iner., 289 N.Y.
597, 43 N.E.2d 830 (1942).
39 Cf. Matter of Haight, 51 App. Div. 310, 316, 64 N.Y. Supp. 1029, 1033
(2d Dep't 1900) (dictum).
40 Robinson v. Martin, 200 N.Y. 159, 93 N.E. 488 (1910); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 424 (1944).
41 Matter of Haight, supra note 39; In re Blind's Will, 138 N.Y.S.2d 210
(Surr. Ct. 1954). Somewhat illustrative of the attitude of some courts regard-
ing conditions generally, and in particular those posing any threat to family
stability, is the decision in Holmes v. Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co.,
92 Conn. 507, 103 At. 640 (1918). There the court held invalid a testamentary
condition requiring the husbands of the alternate beneficiaries to abstain from
the use of tobacco and alcohol on the ground that it was clearly opposed to
public policy as it tended to be "provocative of marital discord." 103 At. at 642.
42 Accord, Matter of Hughes, 225 App. Div. 29, 232 N.Y. Supp. 84 (4th
Dep't 1928), aff'd inm.. 251 N.Y. 529, 168 N.E. 415 (1929) ; Whiton v. Snyder,
54 Hun 552, 555, 8 N.Y. Supp. 119, 120 (Gen. T. 3d Dep't 1889) (dictum).
43 Matter of Haight, supra note 39 at 316, 64 N.Y. Supp. at 1033. In one
case, a testatrix bequeathed her son the income from a trust for life. On his
death the principal was to be paid to his widow and their issue if she and they
were other than his present wife and her issue (who under no circumstances
were to inherit). The court held that, regardless of what the testatrix's actual
intent was, the condition was valid; there was no tendency to induce divorce
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been intended as a support measure. However, if the legatee is al-
ready separated, a condition subjecting a legacy to divestment if the
separation ends is enforceable; 44 it does not induce a future act since
the separated status already exists. Such conditions are justifiable
only where they were intended as provisions for support; in other
instances they should not be recognized as they tend to perpetuate the
disruption.
Conditions which tend to interfere with normal parent-child rela-
tionships are also illegal as against public policy. Thus, provisions
for forfeiture if a child comes into the custody of his father "by legal
means or without the written consent" of a trustee,45 or if children
have social intercourse with their mother or her relatives,"6 have been
held invalid and unenforceable.
Generally, conditions providing for forfeiture if the beneficiary
contests the will in whole or in part, are enforceable. 47 These are
considered to be consistent with public policy in that they discourage
vexatious and frivolous litigation, family quarrels, wasting of the
estate and the defaming of the testator's reputation in protracted
litigation over his will.48 Notwithstanding this general policy, the
condition will not be allowed to work a forfeiture if the contest is
consistent with the public good. For example, if one provision of
the will is attacked on the ground that it violates the rule against
perpetuities, the contestant will not forfeit his share of the estate
under another provision of the will.49  Such a contest is consistent
because the provision for the son remained constant and would not be affected
by any change in his marital relations. Matter of Rothchild, 271 App. Div.
582, 66 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1st Dep't 1946), affd mein., 298 N.Y. 538, 80 N.E.2d
670 (1948).
44 Matter of Hughes, supra note 42; Wright v. Mayer, 47 App. Div. 604,
62 N.Y. Supp. 610 (1st Dep't 1900) (concurring opinion) ; Cooper v. Remsen,
5 Johns. Ch. 459 (N.Y. 1821) (semble); accord, In re Jacobs' Estate, 112
N.Y.S.2d 281 (Surr. Ct. 1952). Contra, Whiton v. Snyder, supra note 42. In
the Jacobs case, a legatee was to inherit if she was divorced at the time of the
testatrix's death. The legatee obtained a divorce shortly after the testatrix
died. The court held that the condition was valid because it did not purport
to induce divorce, and that the bequest was ineffective because the condition was
not met.
45 Matter of Forte, 49 Misc. 327, 267 N.Y. Supp. 603 (Surr. Ct. 1933);
accord, Matter of Carples, 140 Misc. 459, 250 N.Y. Supp. 680 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
46 Matter of Ranney, 161 Misc. 626, 292 N.Y. Supp. 476 (Surr. Ct. 1936)
(alternate holding).
47 See Matter of Kirkholder, 86 Misc. 692, 149 N.Y. Supp. 87 (Surr. Ct.
1914), aff'd, 171 App. Div. 153, 157 N.Y. Supp. 37 (4th Dep't 1916); cf. In re
Von Grimm's Will, 133 N.Y.S.2d 926 (Surr. Ct. 1954). Proceedings to con-
strue a will do not fall under the interdict of a "no contest" clause. Matter
of Mattes, 205 Misc. 1098, 130 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Surr. Ct. 1954) ; Matter of Von
Deilen, 154 Misc. 877, 278 N.Y. Supp. 689 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
48 6 AmERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY 613 (Casner ed. 1952).
49 N.Y. DzcJ. EsT. LAW § 125; Matter of Rosenstein, 152 Misc. 777, 274
N.Y. Supp. 126 (Surr. Ct. 1934); see RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 429(2)(1944) ; 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 635 (Casner ed. 1952).
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with public policy of the state which forbids perpetuities.50 Further-
more, a contest brought on behalf of a minor is consistent with the
public policy which favors the zealous protection of the rights of
infants.5' Similarly, a condition which requires beneficiaries to ratify,
on demand, all of the acts in connection with the administration of an
estate is inconsistent with the public policy which requires strict
accounting of fiducial acts, and is, therefore, voidY2
Performance of Conditions
After the enforceability of the condition has been ascertained,
problems may arise in determining whether or not its requirements
have been satisfactorily met. With regard to conditions subsequent,
the burden of proof is on the party in whom the estate will vest if
the condition is not performed. 53 Here, substantial performance of
the condition is sufficient compliance to prevent divestment.54 In
addition, if performance is impossible, under certain conditions there
will be no forfeiture. 55
With conditions precedent the burden of proof is on the party in
whom the estate will vest if the condition is performed.56 Usually,
literal performance is required, but if there is no gift over to an alter-
nate beneficiary, substantial compliance with the terms of the condition
is acceptable. 57 If performance is impossible, under certain conditions
it may be waived.5 8 Moreover, if there is no performance because
there has been a rejection of a tender of performance, the tender will
be considered as sufficient compliance with the will. 59 In Matter of
Feinson,60 decided in 1950, a testator bequeathed stock to legatees on
the condition precedent that they agree in writing, in a form to be
50 N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAW § 11; N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 42.
51 N.Y. DEcEn. EsT. LAW § 126; Matter of Andrus, 156 Misc. 268, 281 N.Y.
Supp. 831 (Surr. Ct. 1935) (alternate holding) ; accord, Matter of Vandevort,
62 Hun 612, 17 N.Y. Supp. 316 (Gen. T. 5th Dep't 1892).
52 Matter of Andrus, supra note 51; cf. Matter of Smyth, 246 App. Div. 820,
284 N.Y. Supp. 470 (2d Dep't 1936) (per curiam); N.Y. DECED. EST.
LAW § 125.
53 See Hogeboom v. Hall, 24 Wend. 146 (Sup. Ct. 1840). "He %vho may
lose by a breach of the condition, must be plainly put in the wrong." Id. at 150.
See ATKINSON, WILLs 411 (2d ed. 1953).
54 ATKINSON, WiLLs 411 (2d ed. 1953).
55 Livingston v. Gordon, 84 N.Y. 136 (1881); cf. Matter of Ranney, 161
Misc. 626, 630, 292 N.Y. Supp. 476, 480-81 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
56 ATKIrSON, WILLS 410 (2d ed. 1953); accord, Hogeboom v. Hall, supra
note 53 at 150 (dictum).
57 See Matter of Feinson, 200 Misc. 858, 104 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Surr. Ct. 1950);
II DAvDs, NEw YORK LAW OF WILLs § 883 (1924).
58 Livingston v. Gordon, supra note 55; cf. Matter of Feinson, suqpra note 57.
Contra, Martin v. Ballou, 13 Barb. 119, 132 (Gen. T. 4th Dist. 1852) (dictum).
59 Matter of Trybom, 277 N.Y. 106, 13 N.E.2d 596 (1938) ; accord, Living-
ston v. Gordon, supra note 55.60200 Misc. 858, 104 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
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specified by the executor, to vote for the testator's widow as a director
of a corporation. Before the executor had specified the form of the
agreement, one legatee died. Although the legatee had not yet agreed
in writing, he had given the executor his oral assent to be bound. The
court ruled that the legacy should be paid to the estate of the legatee
because the condition had been substantially performed and this per-
formance would effectuate the will of the testator. It should be noted
that in this case there was never any laxity on the legatee's part. The
same result could have been reached by treating the condition as one
which was at all times impossible of complete performance.
Conclusion
The divergence in treatment of realty and personalty is a relic
of the practice, hundreds of years ago, of administering legacies and
devises in different courts. 61 The in terrorem anomaly developed as
a result of that same dichotomy of jurisdiction. Certainly there is
neither purpose nor justification for their existence today. Although
there has been some tendency in recent years toward eliminating
them,6 2 progress must necessarily be slow in eradicating usages so
long established in the law.
SITUS OF INTANGIBLE PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS
It is an apparent anomaly to discuss the situs of intangible
property. Can there be any "'proprietary right, which is not the
object of corporeal substance' "? ' Intangibles, having no physical
existence, occupy no space and therefore can have no actml location.
In conflict of laws problems, however, situs of property often must be
61 See Browder, Conditions And Limitations In Restraint Of Marriage,
39 MicH. L. REv. 1288, 1290-91 (1941).62 Matter of Liberman, 279 N.Y. 458, 468-69, 18 N.E.2d 658, 662 (1939)
(dictum) ; see, e.g., In re Blind's Will, 138 N.Y.S.2d 210 (Surr. Ct. 1954). In
the Blind case, a daughter was to inherit the remainder of property only if she
became a widow or divorced from her then husband, otherwise she was to get
only the income from the property. The court held the condition void as
against public policy as tending to induce divorce. The court further ruled that
the daughter was to get the property, both real and personal, in fee simple
absolute. This, of course, is a departure from the rule that where an illegal
condition is attached to realty, both conditions and devise are void. See note 25
su~pra.
1 Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 2362, 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 233 (K.B. 1769)
see 13 ILL. L. REv. 708, 711-12 (1919).
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